

ARTICLE APPEARED IN  
CHICAGO TRIBUNE Section I

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

27 June 1985

# Arab rage was made in U.S.A.

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Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—In the heat of an Israeli bombing raid over a Beirut neighborhood in summer 1982, several grim Lebanese gunmen approached two Americans and asked, "Why are you killing us?"

In the numb silence that followed the bombing runs, when the silvery Israeli F-15 and F-16 warplanes had raced out of sight, the Shiite men gingerly carried across the littered street a thick, hot shard of metal. It had the letters "U.S.A." stamped on it.

"These are American bombs," they said. "Those are American planes."

American support of Israel has long puzzled and angered Arab states and people, but the United States' acquiescence to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its occupation policy there for the last three years has generated a new frustration and wrath that threatens long-term consequences for the United States.

That rage over Israeli policy and American support of it, diplomats and Arab analysts say, is seen not only in guerrilla attacks against Israeli troops still occupying a portion of south Lebanon but also by the hijacking of Trans World Airlines Flight 847 on June 14, the tragedies of two American Embassy bombings in Beirut and the terrorist killing of 241 U.S. servicemen in Lebanon.

The intense U.S. military and political involvement in the savage land that is Lebanon follows directly from Israel's involvement.

The current hostage stalemate began to form as Israel rounded up nearly 1,200 Lebanese and imprisoned them in Israel to help guarantee a safe pullback for their troops in Lebanon. The release of the Lebanese, now believed to number 735, remains the central condition for the freeing of 39 Americans being held by the hijackers of Flight 847.

But the link between U.S. and Israeli action in Lebanon goes much further, back even before Israel's invasion of June 6, 1982. Its eagerness to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization, and a secret desire by some Israeli

leaders to change the political map of the Middle East by installing their Lebanese Christian allies as rulers of Lebanon, appeared to preordain the tragedy.

When President Reagan was asked last week whether past and present U.S. policies contributed to the rise of radicalism and anti-Americanism in the Middle East, he replied that terrorists had forced withdrawal of the allied peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Then he said:

"We seem to be a target ... because of our friendship and support of Israel. ... There is an anti-Americanism that is rampant there on the part of those who don't want peace with Israel and who have consistently over the years committed terrorist acts against the Israelis."

That is only partly true. Reagan's response ignored Israeli actions over the last three years in Lebanon that repeatedly have been condemned by responsible Western governments, even by the United States.

Significantly, no other war has been as internally divisive in Israel. Those Israeli policies and actions, which the United States either endorsed or failed to oppose, were vehemently condemned by many Israelis, including former generals and leaders of past Labor Party governments.

In his analysis of the invasion and its implications for U.S.-Israeli relations, George Ball, undersecretary of state during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, listed a series of Israeli "betrayals" of America. These included assurances that there would be no invasion without clear provocation, made by former Prime Minister Menachem Begin in January, 1982; the use of cluster bombs in civilian areas; and the Israeli army's violation of numerous cease-fire agreements during the siege of Beirut.

As recently as last April 4, the State Department said Israel was violating international law by transporting prisoners from south Lebanon across the border into Israel.

But Israel and the Arab states view these U.S. statements as mere wrist-slaps. Almost routinely, the United States vetoes or votes against any United Nations resolution critical of Israel.

After the 1982 invasion, the United States "embargoed" the sale of 75 additional F-16 jets to Israel until it withdrew from Lebanon; but that presidential order was rescinded a year later. The jets were not even ready for delivery

during the embargo and now are being delivered on schedule.

Later, embarrassed by Israel's use of American-made cluster bombs—antipersonnel weapons that spray tiny darts of steel—the administration delayed, but did not ban, the delivery of 4,000 cluster artillery shells for Israel's American-made 155-mm. howitzers.

That strong commitment to Israel frustrates and dismays moderate Arab leaders such as Jordan's King Hussein, who lashed out last year at what he considered American inconsistency.

Citing U.S. support of Israel's policy against the Palestinians and in Lebanon, Hussein charged that the United States no longer could be considered an "honest broker" in the Middle East, because it employed a double standard. "I now realize principles mean nothing to the United States," he said, referring to Reagan's fervent support of the Israeli line in a presidential election year.

Arab leaders constantly cite the power of the United States to influence Israeli policy, if only with the threat of delaying ever-increasing economic and military grants. Congress is considering a \$3 billion aid package to Israel next year, up from \$2.6 billion this year, along with \$1.5 billion in special aid to be spread over the two years.

The importance of American opinion to Israeli policy was reflected last weekend when Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Cabinet Minister Moshe Arens appeared on American TV networks to explain their position.

America has pressured Israel more than once, notably in 1978, when it insisted that Israel withdraw its troops from Lebanon after they swept up to the Litani River and installed a puppet militia in a strip along the border.

The current involvement began in mid-1981, when U.S. special envoy Philip Habib negotiated a cease-fire between Israel and the PLO forces in Lebanon. It created a period of quiet on the border that lasted 11 months.

Israel, however, in what later was seen as the build-up to its invasion, began to complain that any attack against Israelis—and then against any Jew anywhere in the world—was a violation of that cease-fire. The United States did not agree. The cease-fire, it said, applied only to the border, and the PLO had strictly honored that.

In early April, 1982, administration and intelligence officials here leaked information of a troop

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build-up along the border that ruined the element of surprise and forced Israel to postpone its invasion. When Israel's ambassador in London was shot, it was the provocation needed to start the war.

After nearly three months of fighting between Israel and the PLO, a U.S. Marine contingent, part of a four-nation peacekeeping force, arrived in Lebanon to end the Israeli siege of West Beirut and guarantee the safe evacuation of the PLO. Once that was accomplished the multinational force left, but it returned after the massacres in the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatilla by Israel's allies, Lebanese Christian militiamen, in September, 1983, that followed the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel.